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The Behavior
of Foreign Dollar Holdings
Introduction
OUR analysis of foreign holdings of liquid dollar assets reveals the
complex composition of the types of liquid dollar assets and the
categories of debtors and creditors having liquid dollar positions.
Changes in the volume and composition of foreign liquid dollar
holdings can be explained only in terms of the functional relation-
ships among the various categories of transactors involved in these
creditor-debtor relationships. Figure 3.1 shows the network of dol-
lar claims between U.S. and foreign residents and among foreign
residents confronting the analyst concerned with the demand and
supply of foreign liquid dollar balances. Each of the categories and
subcategories of foreign liquid dollar holders has a unique asset pref-
erence function, and there are special relationships between each of
the pairs of categories of liquid dollar creditors and debtors. There
are also special markets for particular types of liquid dollar assets,
each operating within a unique institutional framework. In addition
to the limitations imposed by the inadequacy of the data, our knowl-
edge of these functions, relationships, and institutions is too frag-
mentary to permit construction of a complete model of the foreign
demand and supply of liquid dollar assets. The most we can hope
to do is formulate partial models confined to limited sets of rela-
tionships among the variables involved.
In this chapter we are concerned with the origins of foreign dollar
holdings, including both American dollar and Eurodollar deposits,
and with the relationship of changes in these holdings to the U.S.
balance of payments. Closely related to the origins and composi-
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tion of foreign dollar holdings is the substitutability among foreign
holdings of American dollars, Eurodollars, and other currencies.
We shall present empirical evidence relating to the degree of sub-
stitutability. Also c9nsidered here is the influence of the Eurodollar
market on the U.S. balance of payments. Finally, we deal briefly
with the impact of U.S. and foreign monetary policies and controls
on the Eurodollar market.
FIGURE 3.1
Network of Dollar Claims
Arrows point from dollar claimant to debtor. Dotted lines are dollar claims between foreign residents.56 The Behavior of Foreign Dollar Holdings
Origins of Foreign Dollar Holdings
U.S. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND FOREIGN HOLDINGS
OF U.S. DOLLARS
Total foreign holdings of American dollars are, of course, always
a function of the U.S. balance of payments as a whole. However,
a distinction should be made between changes in U.S. liquid liabil-
ities to foreigners which are the result of autonomous transactions
in the U.S. international accounts and those that are accommodat-
ing or causally determined by the sum of all the other transactions.
Changes in foreign nonofficial American dollar holdings are (ex-
cept possibly for very brief periods) always autonomous, while in
recent years a large proportion of the American dollar holdings of
foreign official institutions have been accommodating in the sense
that, given the existing pattern of exchange rates and the existing
foreign nonofficial demand for American dollars, foreign official
institutions are the residual buyers and sellers of American dollars.
Prior to August 15, 1971, the central banks of the major countries
were constrained from converting their dollars into gold at the U.S.
Treasury by the knowledge that too great a U.S. gold loss would
lead the United States to close the gold window. After August 15,
1971, foreign central banks as a group had no choice but to hold
whatever dollars were generated by U.S. balance-of-payments defi-
cits, again given the existing pattern of exchange rates. Individual
foreign official institutions often sought to reduce their American
dollar holdings by redepositing the dollars in the Eurodollar market.
However, no amount of foreign central bank depositing in the Euro-
dollar market could reduce their collective holdings of American
dollars, unless such deposits in some way affected either the foreign
nonofficial demand for American dollars or U.S. resident borrowing
from the Eurodollar market.Otherwise, the dollars loaned by
Eurodollar banks from such deposits would tend to be sold for
foreign currencies and thus to accrue once more to the reserves of
central banks. The result of such depositing would be, therefore,
to increase the sum of American dollars and Eurodollar holdings
combined in foreign official reserves and to add to the plethora of
dollars.Origins of Foreign Dollar Holdings 57
The foreign nonofficial demand for American liquid dollar assets
is determined in part by the transactions and precautionary demand
for dollars and in part by the investment demand for American
liquid dollar assets.This latter demand is a function of the total
foreign demand for liquid assets and of such factors as relative rates
of return, risk, and legal constraints which determine the composi-
tion of liquid asset portfolios. Under present conditions, a reduc-
tion in the foreign nonofficial demand for liquid American dollar
assets will not reduce total foreign holdings of American dollars;
the excess supply of American dollars is simply absorbed by the
foreign central banks. This, of course, assumes that other transac-
tions in the U.S. balance of payments are not affected so as to reduce
the supply of American dollars in the hands of foreigners.
THE GENERATION OF EURODOLLAR DEPOSITS
While changes in total foreign holdings of American dollars must
always be related in some way to the U.S. balance of payments,
changes in the volume of Eurodollar deposits held by foreigners
need have no relationship to the U.S. balance of payments. Nor
does the volume of Eurodollar deposits have any necessary relation-
ship to the volume of American dollars held by foreign banks. A
depositor can acquire Eurodollar deposits with any convertible
currency. If he does not have American dollars, he can readily ac-
quire them in the foreign exchange market, or the Eurobank receiv-
ing the deposit will denominate it in dollars in exchange for what-
ever currency is tendered. In either instance, will not the purchase
in the foreign exchange market of American dollars by either the
depositor or by the Eurobank receiving the deposit increase foreign
nonofficial holdings of American dollars? Only momentarily, since
the American dollars are in most cases quickly lent and then sold
by the borrower in the exchange market for other currencies.
There are, of course, cases where the borrower decides to increase
his holdings of American dollars. In such cases there will be a net
increase in the foreign nonofficial demand for American dollars.
However, there is nothing in the expansion of Eurodollar deposits
and loans per se that will necessarily give rise to a net increase in
the foreign nonofficial demand for American dollars. Hence, addi-
tional foreign holdings of American dollars need not be generated58 The Behavior of Foreign Dollar Holdings
by the U.S. balance of payments to support the growth of the Euro-
dollar market. This is not to deny, however, that changes in the
U.S. balance of payments may affect the Eurodollar market, and
activities in the Eurodollar market may have an impact on the U.S.
balance of payments. More will be said shortly on these relation-
ships.
It has been argued that the maximum potential growth of Euro-
dollar deposits is determined by the volume of American dollars
available to the Eurobanks, since the Eurobanks require dollar re-
serves against Eurodollar deposits.According to this view, the
maximum volume of Eurodollar deposits that can be created is
some multiple of the volume of American dollar holdings of the
Eurodollar banks, analogous to the maximum expansion of com-
mercial bank deposits in a domestic monetary system on the basis
of a given volume of commercial bank reserves.1 Those who reject
this view argue that the proportion of Eurodollar loans redeposited
in the Eurodollar market isrelatively small, and that for most
countries there are no legal reserve requirements on Eurodollar
deposits as there usually are on domestic currency deposits. More-
over, Eurodollar banks need not maintain precautionary reserves
against Eurodollar deposits in U.S. banks; they can just as well keep
dollar reserves in the form of deposits with foreign branches of U.S.
banks (which themselves are Eurodollar banks).In fact, since
1969 foreign commercial banks have had larger deposits with for-
eign branches of U.S. banks than holdings of American liquid dollar
assets. Foreign branches of U.S. banks require no special reserves
against dollar deposits since they can draw on the resources of their
parent banks for meeting their deposit obligations. Thus, to a de-
gree, the ultimate reserves against Eurodollar deposits are the
reserve assets of the U.S. banking system.
Our approach to the problem of the limits of the generation of
1. For an exposition of thisview, see Milton Friedman, "The Eurodollar Mar-
ket: SomeFirstPrinciples," Tue Morgan Guaranty Survey, October 1969, pp.
4ff. For a contrary view, see Fred H. Klopstock, "Money Creation in the Euro-
dollar Market—A Note on Professor Friedman's Views," Monthly Review, Vol.
52, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, January 1970, pp. 12—15. For an ex-
cellent summary of the various arguments relating to Eurodollar creation, see
Fritz Machiup, "The Eurodollar System and Its Control," Papers andProceed-
ings of a Conference on International Monetary Problems, Washington, D.C.:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972.Origins of Foreign Dollar Holdings 59
Eurodollar deposits is that Eurocurrency deposits constitute a part
of the total volume of commercial bank liquidity in the Eurobank-
ing system. The amounts of the particular currencies in which this
liquidity is denominated are not subject to any special limitation
other than those imposed by governments to control the Eurocur-
rency operations of their commercial banks. In the absence of con-
trols, depositors can acquire Eurodollars or other Eurocurrencies
or the domestic currency of the bank receiving the deposit with any
convertible currency. The Eurobanks offer interest rates for various
Eurocurrencies in accordance with the demand for loans in these
currencies, the rate to individual borrowers reflecting the interbank
rate for the individual Eurocurrencies. Interest rate differentials be-
tween deposits or loans in different Eurocurrencies reflect both
speculative forces in the exchange market and domestic credit con-
ditions in the countries whose currencies are involved. Covered
Eurocurrency rates tend to move rather closely together, but interest
rates for Eurodollars, Euro-Deutsche marks, Euro-Swiss francs, and
Eurosterling will frequently depart rather sharply from interest rates
in the domestic market of the countries whose currencies are in-
volved.2 Such deviations generally reflect national monetary con-
trols that seek to insulate the domestic money markets from the
Eurocurrency markets.
The constraint on the expansion of Eurocurrency deposits and
loans comes not from the supply of dollars or any other currency
(which currencies the banks can readily acquire in accordance with
their need for meeting obligations) but from the constraints on the
total creation of deposit liabilities imposed in the aggregate by the
individual actions of the world's monetary authorities. Commercial
banks are usually required to keep legal reserves against domestic
deposit liabilities, but prudent management would seem to deter-
mine that they maintain minimum liquid reserves against all deposit
liabilities. However, liquid reserves against external liabilities can
be held in a variety of forms and in any convertible currency. What
is important for banks is that their liabilities and assets in any par-
ticular currency be reasonably well matched by maturity dates.
This is a primary function of the interbank market for Eurocurren-
2. For a good discussion of these relationships, see BIS, Forty-Second Annual
Report, Basle, June 1972, pp. 159—164.w
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cies; the rates in these markets tend to equalize collective demand
and supply for each Eurocurrency and for each maturity. In addi-
tion, banks operate in the forward markets for each of the currencies
in which they deal.
In analyzing the generation of Eurodollar deposits, it is important
to note that not only can nonbank depositors acquire Eurodollar
deposits with any convertible currency, but also that the volume of
Eurodollar loans does not depend upon the volume of nonbank
Eurodollar deposits. Thus, we showed in Tables 2.5 and 2.8 that
in 1970 Eurodollar loans to foreign nonbanks approximately dou-
bled while foreign nonbank deposits were nearly unchanged, and
that in 1971 Eurodollar loans to foreign nonbanks continued to
rise while foreign nonbank Eurodollar deposits declined sharply.
The repayment of Eurodollar loans by U.S. residents, the substantial
increase in Eurodollar deposits of foreign official institutions, and
the generation of Eurodollar loan funds by foreign commercial
banks through swap agreements with their central banks or by ac-
quiring U.S. dollars in the exchange market all played a role in
these developments. Some of the dollars placed in Eurodollar de-
posits were used by the Eurocurrency banks for switching into other
currencies for loans to customers, or the customers themselves fre-
quently switched the dollars into another currency required by the
purpose for which the loan was negotiated. All these developments
are scarcely in accord with a model that regards the volume of Euro-
dollar deposits as determined by the redepositing of Eurodollar
loans and the expansion of Eurodollar deposits as requiring the
acquisition of American dollar reserves.
Continued U.S. dollar deficits have served to increase the supply
of funds for deposits in the Eurocurrency market.This is true
because, in the absence of restraining actions by the monetary au-
thorities, countries with balance-of-payments surpluses (whether
with the United States or other countries) tend to generate internal
as well as external liquidity. The surplus liquidity in the hands of
foreign private entities tends to flow into the Eurocurrency market,
and the growth of reserves of central banks makes them willing to
supply dollars to the market. Whether there is an actual loss of
reserves for any particular foreign country depends on whether there
are net short-term capital transfers out of that country to other- -w
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countries.If there were no U.S. borrowing from the Eurodollar
market and all of the dollars deposited in the Eurodollar banks by
residents of a particular country were loaned to other residents of
that country for financing domestic expenditures, there would be
no loss of official reserves in that country arising out of the opera-
tions of the Eurodollar market. Thus it may be said that, while U.S.
deficits are not necessary for the expansion of the Eurodollar mar-
ket, the fact that they have contributed to the expansion of the
reserves of foreign countries has increased the volume of liquidity
available for deposit in the market, and has made monetary author-
ities willing to permit capital transfers to other countries via the
mechanism of the market.
In summary, foreign Eurodollar balances are generated as a con'
sequence of a desire on the part of foreigners to hold their liquid
assets in the form of Eurodollars in response to the relatively attrac-
tive interest rates (adjusted for the cost of covering in the forward
exchange market) that the foreign banks are offering; the rates that
the banks are able to offer depend upon the demand for Eurodollar
loans. In short, Fritz Machiup's characterization of Eurodollar crea-
tion as a "mystery story" appears to derive more from the fictions
of the economic analysts than from the facts of the market.3
Substitutability Among American Dollars, Eurodollars,
and Other Currencies
Liquid asset holders that tend to acquire international (andnot
simply domestic) assets have the option of holding a variety of
short-term assets denominated in various convertible, currencies for
which there exist international markets.In addition, the Euro-
currency market provides liquid asset holders with an option as to
where they will hold their liquid assets regardless of the international
currency in which the assets are denominated. Thus, sterling de-
posits may be held in London or in the form of Eurosterling depos-
its in other countries, just as dollar deposits may be held in the
United States or as Eurodollar deposits in foreign countries. There
isalso a growing market for Euro-Deutsche marks, Euro-Swiss
3. See Fritz Machiup, "Eurodollar Creation: A Mystery Story," Banca Na-
zionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, No. 94, September 1970.62 The Behavior of Foreign Dollar Holdings
francs, Euroguilders, etc.There is a fairly high degree of sübsti-
tutability among all international liquid assets.However, because
of the exchange rate risk and cost of conversion associated with
the transfer of one currency to another, the degree of substitutability
differs between assets denominated in the same currencies but held
in different countries from that between assets denominated in dif-
ferent currencies.
Given the necessary data, the analysis of the foreign demand for
the several types of liquid assets would be facilitated by the use of
a portfolio-adjustment model, according to which asset holders are
assumed to hold a certain composition of assets, for a given set of
yield differentials, risk evaluations, and other preference variables,
and to adjust their portfolios with changes in these variables and in
the total value of their portfolios. Changes in holdings of any par-
ticular asset, say, U.S. CDs, would be related to changes in the
variables determining the composition of the asset holdings and to
changes in the net worth of the transactor.4 Such a model is more
realistic than the older short-term capital-flow approach that as-
sumes that, with a given interest differential, investors will continue
to shift indefinitely from lower yielding assets to the higher yielding
assets.5 As will be noted below, on the basis of the limited data
4. Examples of the employment of portfolio-adjustment models include H. G.
Grubel, "Internationally Diversified Portfolios," A inerican Economic Review, De-
cember 1968, pp. 1299—13 14; and Ralph C. Bryant and P. H. Hendershott, Finaii-
cia!CapitalFlows and theBalanceof Paymentsof the United States: An Ex-
plqratory Empirical Study, Princeton Essays in International Finance, No. 25,
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, June 1970. For an analysis of the
problems relating to the formulation of portfolio-adjustment models and a critical
review of models of international capital movements, see Edward E. Learner and
Robert M. Stern, "Problems in the Theory and Empirical Estimation of Inter-
national Capital Movements," International Mobility and Movement of Capital,
New York: NBER, U-NB 24, 1972, PP. 17 1—206.
5. Empirical studies of capital movements based on capital-flow models have
tended to yield unsatisfactory and conflicting results.Examples of short-term
capital-flow models of this type are found in P. W. Bell, "Private Capital Move-
ments and the U.S. Balance of Payments Position," Factors Affecting the U.S.
BalanceofPayments, Washington, D.C.: Joint Economic Committee Compen-
dium of Papers, 1962; and in P. B. Kenen, "Short-term Capital Movements and
the U.S. Balance of Payments," and Benjamin J. Cohen, "A Survey of Capital
Movements and Findings Regarding their Sensitivity," both in The United States
Balance of Paymnemrts, Washington, D.C.: Hearings before the Joint Economic
Committee, 1963.Substitutability 63
available we do not find liquid asset holders to be highly sensitive
to shifts in relative yields.Each group of liquid asset portfolio
holders or transactors has a unique preference function in terms of
rate of return, risk and other preference variables, and a relevant
net worth variable. For example, U.S. firms operating abroad tend
to have a high preference for Eurodollars over American dollars.
Moreover, foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms may be constrained by
the U.S. foreign direct investment control program from shifting
funds to their U.S. parents that they expect to use later in their
foreign operations. However, they may be led to shift these funds
into a nondollar currency which they will require for future ex-
penditures if that èurrency is expected to appreciate in relation to
the dollar.(They may even take an uncovered position in such a
currency.) Other groups of liquid asset portfolio holders may have
quite different preferences, although all portfolio holders are influ-
enced in some degree by changes in relative yields on different types
of assets.
Unfortunately, the data available on non-U.S. resident holdings
of American dollars, Eurodollars, and other currencies are not dis-
aggregated by. class of transactor in a manner that would permit us
to formulate and test portfolio-adjustment functions. Nor are there
data on changes in the relevant net worth of various categories of
transactors. Therefore, we shall not attempt the construction of a
comprehensive model of the foreign demand and supply of liquid
dollar assets. We shall, however, explore some of the factors deter-
mining the composition of foreign liquid asset holdings which may
throw light on the foreign demand for various categories of liquid
dollar assets. Keeping in mind our underlying concept of a port-
folio-adjustment model, we shall consider the evidence relating to
the degree of substitutability among American dollars, Eurodollars,
and other currencies.
FOREIGN NONBANK HOLDINGS—AMERICAN DOLLARS
AND EURODOLLARS
There isa high degree of substitutability between American
liquid dollar assets and Eurodollars, just as there is a high degreew
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of substitutability among various types of American liquid dollar
assets differentiated by yield, maturity, risk, and cost of conversion
into transactions media, i.e., demand deposits in a U.S. resident
bank.Although Eurodollar deposits are not generally used for
transactions purposes, call Eurodollar deposits with the London
branch of a U.S. bank must be as liquid as time deposits in the
bank's head office in New York. Eurodollar deposits may involve
some additional risk in the minds of holders over direct deposits in
U.S. banks or other liquid American assets, but this risk varies a
great deal with the country in which the Eurodollar deposit is held.
The reason, presumably, is that much of the risk arises from the
possibility of government exchange controls restricting the right of
the Eurodollar depositor to obtain American dollars.° This risk is
slight in most Western European countries, even though there are
exchange restrictions on the acquisition of Eurodollar deposits by
residents in some of these countries.
Foreign holders of liquid dollar assets may find it more con-
venient to hold Eurodollar deposits with their own bank or with a
bank in another European country with which they have close busi-
ness relations than to hold liquid dollar assets in a bank in the
United States which they do not know. They may find it less risky
to hold their dollars in a Swiss bank as compared with a U.S. bank
if they want to conceal their foreign exchange holdings from domes-
tic authorities. They may even have more confidence in the solvency
of a European bank with which they are familiar than in a U.S.
bank which they do not know. Thus, it is not always the case that
foreigners prefer American dollars over Eurodollars; the preference
may be just the opposite. But for U.S. resident liquid asset holders
it will nearly always be more convenient and less risky to hold their
dollars in the United States, unless, of course, they have tax or other
reasons to conceal their assets. However, as noted above, U.S. non-
financial corporations are subject to a special constraint on holding
Eurodollar deposits or any other foreign assets by reason of U.S.
government controls on the outflow of capital.
6. Historically there have been small differences inrates paid by foreign
branches of American banks located in different countries. These interest differ-
entials may reflect in part differences in risk in the minds of depositors.—-w - w
Substitutability 65
InterestRate Differentials.Prior to 1969, the differential be-
tween U.S. CD rates and Eurodollar deposit rates tended to be well
under 1 percent and occasionally less than 0.5 percent in favor of
Eurodollar deposits. There was a noticeable exception in the sec-
ond half of 1966 when tight credit conditions in the United States,
coupled with a ceiling of 5.5 percent on CDs (issued under Federal
Reserve Regulation 0), led U.S. banks to increase their borrowing
from the Eurodollar market by some $2 billion between the end
of June 1966 and the end of December of that year. This resulted
in a differential of 150 basis points (i.e., 1.5 percent) between the
three-month Eurodollar rate and the three-month (new issue) CD
rate, and a differential of over 100 basis points between the three-
month Eurodollar rate and the secondary market yield for ninety-
day CDs. During 1969 there was a similar but more striking devel-
opment as large U.S. bank borrowings from the Eurodollar market
forced the three-month Eurodollar deposit rate to 11.3 percent in
September 1969, some 530 basis points above the 6.0 percent ceiling
on new issue CDs and 256 basis points above the U.S. secondary
market yield for ninety-day CDs.7 By the end of July 1970, the
spread between the three-month Eurodollar rate and the U.S. sec-
ondary market yield for CDs had narrowed to 40 basis points8 (see
Table 3.1).
During the periods of monetary crisis in 1971 the spread between
the Eurodollar deposit rate and the U.S. secondary market CD rate
again widened; it was 244 basis points at the end of May 1971 and
313 basis points at the end of August. These large differentials were
evidently associated with a heavy demand for Eurodollar loans,
partly for conversion into Deutsche marks and other strong Euro-
pean currencies, while the foreign supply of Eurodollar deposits
7. For a discussion of the relationship between Eurodollar deposit rates and
U.S. money market rates during this period, see Ira 0. Scott, Jr., The Eurodollar
Market anditsPublic Policy implications, Washington, D.C.: Joint Economic
Committee, Congress of the United States, 1970.
8. Effective June 24, 1970, maximum interest rates on CDs of $100,000 or
more were removed for both U.S. residents and foreign nonofficial residents.
Regulation Q has not applied in recent years to CDs in U.S. banks held by foreign
official agencies. For this reason, interest rates on official agency CDs (which are
subject to negotiation and whose rates are not published), have tended to move
within a much narrower range of Eurodollar deposit rates than have CDs avail-
able to nonofficial agencies and individuals.w — - — — -
66 The Behavior of Foreign Dollar Holdings
TABLE 3.1
Eurodollar Deposit Rates, U.S. Interest Rates, and Changes
in U.S. Domestic and Foreign Branch Bank
Liabilities to Foreign Nonbanks, June 1968—December 1971






Month U.S. Liabili- Liabili-
Euro-Secondary ties toChangeties toChange
dollarMarket ForeignfromForeignfrom
Deposit Rate (1) — Non-PreviousNon-Previous
Rate for CDs (2) banksMonthbanksMonth
(1) (2)
1968
June 6.75% 6.03% .72% 2,478 2,101
July 6.19 5.88 .31 2,498 20 2,248 147
August 6.13 5.85 .28 2,545 47 2,248 0
September6.19 5.65 .54 2,562 17 2,280 32
October 6.63 6.03 .60 2,601 39 2,455 175
November6.88 6.08 .80 2,670 69 2,521 66
December7.06 6.58 .48 2,647 —23 2,538 17
1969
January 7.56 6.45 1.11 2,676 29 2,447 —91
February 8.38 .6.65 1.73 2,620 —56 2,759 312
March 8.44 6.65 1.79 2,638 18 2,924 165
April 8.44 6.85 1.59 2,618 —20 3,220 296
May 10.25 7.55 2.70 2,613 —5 3,282 62
June 10.50 8.25 2.25 2,498 —115 3,798 516
July 10.38 8.75 1.63 2,457 —41 4,528 730
August 11.13 8.25 2.88 2,417 —40 4,734 206
September11.31 8.75 2.56 2,290 —1274,748(4,2 14) 14
October 9.75 8.50 1.25 2,233 —57 4,625 411
November10.94 8.75 2.19 2,186 —47 4,504 —121
December10.13 9.00 1.132,230(2,352) 44 4,851 347
1970
January 9.56 8.70 .86 2,312 —40 5,016 165
February 9.31 8.63 .68 2,226 —86 4,932 —84
March 8.50 6.75 1.75 2,198 —28 4,953 21
April 8.56 7.75 .81 2,189 —9 4,900 —53
May 9.06 8.04 1.02 2,279 90 5,278 378
June 9.00 8.13 .87 2,327 48 4,964 —314
July 8.38 7.98 .40 2,279 —48 4,905 —59
August 8.06 7.73 .33 2,258 —21 5,056 151
September8.38 7.39 .99 2,260 2 4,936 —120
October 7.63 6.65 .98 2,301 41 4,843 —93
November7.19 5.92 1.27 2,296 —5 5,177 334
December6.44 5.59 .852,348(2,350) 52 4,874 —303SOURCES: Treasury Bulletin, November 1970; Federal Reserve Bulletin, various issues;
U.S. Financial Data, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, various issues; and Morgan
Guaranty Trust Company of New York, World Financial Markets, various issues.
NOTE: Figures in parentheses are comparable with those shown for the following
dates. Figures not in parentheses are comparable with those shown for previous dates.
was restricted by reason of the expectation of a dollar depreciation.9
But by the end of May 1972, the rate differential in favor of Euro-
dollar deposits had nearly disappeared.
The effect of these changes in the relative yields on Eurodollar
deposits and U.S. CDs on foreign nonbank holdings of American
interest-earnings dollar assets and Eurodollar deposits is not readily
discernible from the available data.If there were only these two
9. Since there are no legal restrictions on shifting noncorporate funds by U.S.
residents to the Eurodollar market (and indeed large amounts of both corporate
and noncorporate funds were shifted abroad during 1971), it is somewhat surpris-
ing that these rate differentials reached the levels they did.Perhaps large U.S.
investors who were able to move their funds around the world moved them into
European currencies where their expectations of short-term capital gains were









Month U.S. Liabili- Liabili-
Euro-Secondary ties toChangeties toChange
dollar Market ForeignfromForeignfrom
Deposit Rate (1) — Non-PreviousNon-Previous
Rate for CDs (2) banksMonthbanksMonth
(1) (2)
1971
January 5.81% 4.84% .97% 2,349 1 4,513 —361
February 5.44 4.21 1.23 2,376 27 4,749 236
March 5.31 3.83 1.48 2,351 —25 4,794 45
April 6.25 4.72 1.53 2,323 —28 4,612 —182
May 7.56 5.12 2.44 2,304 —19 4,630 18
June 6.50 5.43 1.07 2,197 —107 4,775 145
July 6.69 5.80 .89 2,198 1 4,530 —245
August 8.88 5.75 3.13 2,155 —43 4,956 426
September7.75 2.09 2,068 —87 4,752 —204
October 5.94 5.18 .76 2,029 —39 4,878 126
November6.44 4.89 1.55 2,053 24 4,910 32
December5.75 4.58 1.172,031(2,034)—22 4,953 43-
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categories of liquid asset holdings, a priori reasoning would suggest
that an increase in the spread between Eurodollar deposit rates and
the U.S. CD rate in favor of Eurodollar deposits would be accom-
panied by a reduction in foreign nonbank holdings of interest-
earning American liquid dollar assets in relation to foreign nonbank
holdings of Eurodollar deposits. Table 3.1 shows, for the period
from June 1968 to December 1971, monthly changes in these hold-
ings, the series on Eurodollar deposits being of necessity limited to
the liabilities reported by foreign branches of U.S. banks. Table 3.1
also gives the spread in interest rates at the end of each month over
the period. During 1969 the interest rate differential in favor of
Eurodollar deposits was substantially greater than in 1968. Over
the same period, foreign nonbank deposits in foreign branches of
U.S. banks nearly doubled from $2.5 billion to $4.9 billion, while
short-term interest-earning American dollar assets held by foreign
nonbanks declined from $2.6 billion to $2.2 billion. During 1970
the interest differential, while much lower than in 1969, remained
close to the level reachedthe end of that year. There was also
little overall change in foreign nonbank holdings of either liquid
dollar assets in the United States or of Eurodollar deposits in for-
eign branches of U.S. banks. During the next seven months, to the
end of July 1971, there was a decline in foreign nonbank holdings
of both American liquid dollar assets and Eurodollar deposits,
though the interest differential in favor of the latter was higher on
the average.This development undoubtedly reflected the heavy
speculation against the dollar during this period. Foreign nonbank
holdings of Eurodollar deposits in foreign branches of U.S. banks
then recovered abruptly to approximately the level at the end of
1970 as the interest differential again increased sharply, if only
temporarily, while foreign nonbank holdings of American liquid
dollar assets declined further. During the first four months of 1972,
foreign nonbank holdings of Eurodollar deposits with U.S. branches
rose sharply to an all-time high of $5.9 billion at the end of April
1972, while their holdings of interest-earning American liquid
dollar assets remained approximately the same. Yet the spread
between U.S. money market rates and Eurodollar deposit rates in
favor of the latter narrowed substantially during this period as corn-
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On a month-to-month basis for the period from June 1968 to
December 1971, changes in the composition of liquid dollar assets
of foreign nonbanks did not occur in accordance with changes in
the spread between the Eurodollar deposit rate and the U.S. sec-
ondary market rate for CDs. In 42 observations recorded in Table
3.1, the movements were in accordance with a priori expectations
in only 10 cases. This may have been due in part to the nature of
the data: only month-to-month changes in assets and end-of-the-
month interest rates were available. Weekly data on changes in
holdings of liquid dollar assets in relation to the average weekly
spread between Eurodollar deposit rates and U.S. CD rates might
have indicated greater sensitivity. There are also undoubtedly lags
in response to changes in interest rate differentials on the part of
portfolio holders. More importantly, however, foreign liquid asset
portfolio holders have the option of changing their holdings of non-
dollar currency assets in response to interest differentials and to
expectations with respect to the exchange value of the dollar. The
period under examination was one of heavy speculative movements.
Two other factors might be mentioned in connection with the
interest sensitivity of liquid asset holdings. The first is that once the
Eurodollar deposits have been acquired, say, with a maturity of
three to six months, the depositor must pay a penalty to liquidate
them and may, therefore, prefer to hold them to maturity unless
there are compelling reasons of risk or speculative advantage to
shift to another currency. The second point, stressed in the port-
folio-adjustment model of capital flows, is that when investors have
shifted their funds in response to a change in yield differentials, a
further increase in the differential in favor of a particular type of
asset may not bring the same type of response since investors may
have already shifted those funds that can be readily shifted without
penalty or without interference with some other objective in their
preference function.
Other Evidence of Substitution. Although there is little evidence
of substitution between foreign holdings of American liquid dollar
assets and Eurodollar deposits in response to interest rate differen-
tials, the growth of the Eurodollar market may very well have had
a retarding effect on the growth of foreign holdings of Americanw
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liquid dollar assets.If we consider first foreign commercial banks,
satisfactory evidence of such substitution is difficult to uncover be-
cause of the large volume of intra-multinational bank balances and
the failure of the statistics to distinguish these balances and other
foreign, commercial bank assets.For foreign nonbank holdings,
however, there is a certain amount of indirect evidence of substitu-
tion of Eurodollars for American liquid dollar assets. This substi-
tution is probably long run or structural rather than short run in
the sense of month-to-month or quarter-to-quarter shifts in holdings
between the two types of liquid dollar assets, although we did find
a modest inverse correlation between quarter-to-quarter changes in
foreign nonbank holdings of American liquid dollar assets and for-
eign nonbank deposits in foreign branches of U.S. banks over the
1965—70 period.'0
Between the end of 1957 and the end of 1964, American liquid
dollar assets of foreign nonbanks rose by 41 percent, while world
trade in current dollars increased by about 50 percent. During this
same period, total liquid dollar asset holdings of foreign nonbanks,
including both American dollars and Eurodollars, increased by
nearly 130 percent (Table 3.2). Between the end of 1964 and the
end of 1968, American liquid dollar holdings of foreign nonbanks
rose by about 32 percent while world trade in current dollars rose
by about 40 percent. During this same period, total liquid dollar
assets of foreign nonbanks increased by about 95 percent. How-
ever, during the 1968—70 period, American liquid dollar asset
holdings of foreign nonbanks declined, but world trade increased
by about 30 percent in current dollars.It was during this period
that foreign nonbank holdings of Eurodollars achieved their maxi-
mum growth, rising from $9.3 billion at the end of 1968 to $17.6
billion at the end of 1970. Thus, in spite of a decrease in foreign
nonbank holdings of American dollars, total liquid dollar holdings
of foreign nonbanks increased by 56 percent over the 1968—70
period.In 1971, foreign nonbank holdings of both U.S. dollars
10. When we regressed quarter-to-quarter changes in foreign nonbank holdings
of American liquid dollar assets on quarter-to-quarter changes in foreign nonbank
dollar deposits with foreign branches of U.S. banks, we obtained a significant
inverse correlation but the R2 was only .19.(Both the slope and coefficient of
correlation are significantly different from zero at the 99 percent level of con-
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TABLE 3.2
World Trade and Liquid Dollar Holdings
of Foreign Nonbanks
(end of period; billions of dollars)
1957 1964 1968 1969 1970 1971
World trade (imports,cif)a106.8 161.2 225.0 256.4 294..1 329.0
Foreign nonbanks
1. U.S.dollarsb 2.7 3.8 5.0 4.6 4.7 4.2
2. Eurodollarso 0.5 3.5 9.3 17.2 17.6 14.5
Subtotal 3.2 7.3 14.3 21.8 22.3 18.7
a. International Financial Statistics, various issues.
b. Table 2.1.
c. Table 2.5. The figure for 1964 is based on BIS data. The figure for 1957 is derived
from dollar liabilities to nonbanks reported by the Bank of Canada and the Bank of
England.
and of Eurodollar deposits declined, probably as a consequence of
the uncertainty regarding the future exchange value of the dollar.
While by no means conclusive, the above data strongly suggest sub-
stitution of Eurodollar deposits for American liquid dollar holdings
from the end of 1968 to the end of 1970.
With regard to foreign official holdings of Eurodollar deposits,
their rapid growth (especially during 1970 when they rose from
$4.3 billion to $9.2 billion) suggests that foreign official institutions
were substituting Eurodollar deposits for American liquid dollar
holdings (Table 2.6).Undoubtedly there was a substantial net
substitution on the part of central banks and governments outside
of the major Western European countries and Japan. However, as
has already been explained, the depositing of American dollars by
foreign central banks in the Eurodollar market does not reduce the
American dollar holdings of foreign official institutions as a group.




In recent years foreign nonbank holders of liquid asset portfolios
have held the bulk of their liquid dollar assets in the form of Euro-72 The Behavior of Foreign Dollar Holdings
dollar deposits.'1In fact, foreign nonbank holdings of Eurodollar
deposits with "inside area" and Canadian banks alone were nearly
six times the level of their holdings of short-term, interest-earning
U.S. dollar assets at the end of 1969 and at the end of 1970. For-
eign nonbank holdings of American short-term, interest-earning
dollar assets (the sum of lines 1C2 and 1C3 in Table 2.1) have been
remarkably stable, at least since 1965, ranging between $2 and $3
billion, while there have been substantial fluctuations in their hold-
ings of Eurodollars. Thus it is unlikely that the rise in foreign non-
bank holdings of Eurodollars from $7.0 billion at the end of 1966
to $17.6 billion at the end of 1970 (Table 2.5) occurred mainly at
the expense of their holdings of American liquid dollar assets, al-
though it is likely that there was some substitution. Nor can the
sharp drop of $3.1 billion in foreign nonbank Eurodollar holdings
between the end of 1970 and the end of 1971 be explained by a
shift into American liquid dollar assets (holdings of which also
declined). Thus fluctuations in the volume of Eurodollar deposits
held by foreign nonbank portfolio holders must be largely explained
by substitution between Eurodollars and other currencies rather
than between Eurodollars and American dollars.
As we have already observed, prior to 1969 the spread between
interest rates on Eurodollar deposits and comparable U.S. money
market rates was usually less than 100.basis points. This was also
true Only during abnormal money market or foreign
exchange market conditions has this spread risen above 200 basis
points. On the other hand, uncovered interest rate differentials
between Eurodollar deposit rates and money market rates in certain
countries, e.g., Germany and Switzerland, were continuously in ex-
cess of 200 basis points prior to 1969 and differentials of 300—400
basis points have not been uncommon.12 Moreover, as may be noted
in Table 3.3, substantial differentials between covered Eurodollar
deposit rates and comparable money market rates in Britain, Ger-
many, and Switzerland, ranging well above 300 basis points, have
11. Except for working balances of trading firms, Eurodollar deposits probably
constitute half or more of all foreign nonbank liquid asset holdings in currencies
other than the domestic currency of the holder.
12. Differentials of over 500 basis points between uncovered three-month Euro-
dollar deposit rates and Swiss three-month deposit rates occurred in 1969, 1971,
and 1972 and between Eurodollar deposit rates and German three-month deposit
rates in 1969.Substitutability
TABLE3.3
Quarterly Changes in Foreign Nonbank Dollar Deposits
in Foreign Branches of U.S. Banks, and Covered
Eurodollar—Domestic Market Interest Rate Differentials
(percentages)
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SOURCES: Morgan GuarantyTrustCompany of New York, World Financial Markets,
and I MF, International Financial Statistics for interest rates. Foreign branch data from
Federal Reserve Bulletin, February 1972 and July 1972.
a. Covered Eurodollar three-month deposit rate minus three-month U.K. local au-
thority deposit rate.
b. Covered three-month Eurodollar rate minus three-month Swiss deposit rate.
c. Covered Eurodollar deposit rate minus three-month German deposit rate.
Quarterly Change in
Nonbank Dollar Quarterly Average Covered
Deposits in Foreign Eurodollar-Domestic Market
Branches of U.S. Banks Interest Rate Differential
All U.K..
Quarters Branches Branches U.K.a Swiss" German°
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1966
3rd .45 1.46 .87
4th 11.24 13.11 .33 2.01 .53
1967
1st —4.07 —5.80 — .04 .73 .87
2nd 4.31 .67 .12 .64 .53
3rd 12.13 17.62 .31 .35 .45
4th 13.16 18.68 .95 .95 — .33
1968
1st 4.96 1.63 1.79 .49 .13
2nd 3.45 4.60 3.38 .94 .29
3rd 8.52 14.67 1.05 .65 .33
4th 11.32 13.03 2.11 1.62 —.47
1969 .
1st 15.21 14.44 2.66 1.88 .13
2nd 29.89 31.64 5.40 2.96 — .40
3rd 25.03 23.43 6.37 4.66 .17
4th 15.12 7.48 2.14 2.90 .95
1970
1st 2.10 2.40 .64 3.44 .37
2nd .22 —3.22 1.21 1.91 .31
3rd —.56 —5.60 1.57 .74 — .01
4th —1.26 —.93 .85 .61 —.32
1971
1st —1.64 —5.03 .83 .41 —.27
2nd —.40 —5.20 1.59 .93 —.23
3rd —1.15 —.78 1.59 —.05 —1.14
4th 4.23 4.60 .89 —1.09 —1.37The Behavior of Foreign Dollar Holdings












1. Col. (1) on cal. (3) .50 19.1s sig. at 1%
level
19 1.15
2. Col. (2) on cal. (3) .34 9.6k sig. at 1%
level
19 1.16
3. Col. (1) on cal. (4) .38 11.7a sig.at 1%
level
19 .94
4. Col. (2) on col. (4) .23 55a sig. at 5% 19 .91
. level
5. Col.(1) on cols. (3) & (4) .55 11.2a(3) sig. at 5%
level
(4) sig. at 1%
level
18 1.2




7. Col. (1) on col. (5) norel. 19
8. Col. (2) on col. (5) nord. 19
Cols. (1) + (2) D-W indeterminate atboth 5%and 1% levels
Cols. (3) + (4) D-W significant at 1%level
Cols. (5) + (5) D-W significant at 5%level
Nom: Due to the possible presence of autocorrelation, both the values and the sig-
nificance of the R2s may be greatly overstated.
a. Significant at the 1% level.
b. Significant at the 5%level.
occurred at times in recent years. These differentials reflect the risk
of exchange controls, transactions costs, and governmental restric-
tions on capital movements. Nevertheless, the covered rate differ-
entials in particular appear at times to be surprisingly large. The
extent to which foreign nonbank depositors cover their Eurodollar
deposits is not known to the authors. Conceivably many liquid asset
holders are motivated more by a desire to speculate on a change in
exchange rates than by a desire to earn a larger interest yield during
certain periods.
The only reasonably reliable monthly or quarterly data on for-
eign nonbank Eurodollar deposits are those for deposits in foreign
branches of U.S. banks. Again there is no breakdown of these de-
posits by country of origin. Nevertheless, we sought to determine
whether there was any relationship between changes in foreign non-
r
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bank deposits and changes in differentials between covered three-
month Eurodollar deposit rates and domestic three-month deposit
rates in Britain, Switzerland, and Germany, respectively. We re-
gressed month-to-month changes in foreign nonbank deposits in
foreign branches of U.S. banks and in U.K. branches alone on the
average monthly differentials between covered Eurodollar deposit
rates and domestic deposit rates in Britain, Switzerland, and Ger-
many, respectively, over the period June 1966—December 1971.
We found significant coefficients for our regressions but rather low
R2s (on the order of .15). We tried lagging the monthly data but
with no better results. We then did the same regressions employing
quarterly data for the period June 1966—December 1971 and
found some significant relationships(see Table 3.3).For the
regression of percentage (quarter-to-quarter) changes in foreign
nonbank deposits in all foreign branches of U.S. banks on the
covered Eurodollar-U.K.Local Authority deposit rate differen-
tial, we obtained an R2 of .50.For the same regression using
the covered Eurodollar-Swiss deposit ratedifferential, we ob-
tained an R2 of .38. (In both cases the F-test on the correlation co-
eflicient and the t-test on the variable were significant at the 1
percent level but the DW statistic suggests the possible presence of
autocorrelation.) When we regressed percentage (quarter-to-quar-
ter) changes in foreign nonbank deposits in all foreign branches of
U.S. banks on the Eurodollar-U.K. Local Authority deposit rate
and the Eurodollar-Swiss deposit rate differentials combined, we
obtained an R2 of .55. However, we found no relation using the
covered Eurodollar-German deposit rate differentials. We also per-
formed the same regressions using foreign nonbank deposits in U.K.
branches of U.S. banks. The results were significant (again except
for the covered Eurodollar-German deposit rate differential), but
the R2s were lower. While this evidence is by no means conclusive,
it does point to the existence of a strong influence of interest rate
differentials on the behavior of foreign nonbank Eurodollar deposits.
CHANGES IN EURODOLLAR POSITIONS
OF FOREIGN COMMERCIAL BANKS
Eurodollar banks usually stand ready to accept all Eurodollar
deposits offered, but the rate of interest they are willing to pay de-76 The Behavior of Foreign Dollar Holdings
positors depends upon the demand for Eurodollar loans from Euro-
dollar banks as a group. An individual Eurodollar bank can re-
deposit with other Eurodollar banks any excess of deposits over the
demand for Eurodollar loans. When the demand for loans exceeds
Eurodollar deposits, a Eurodollar bank can obtain additional funds
in the inter-Eurodollar bank market, or from the foreign exchange
market, or from its central bank under a swap arrangement or out-
right purchase against domestic currency. The demand for Euro-
dollar loans will depend in considerable measure on the relationship
between Eurodollar loan rates and the loan rates in the domestic
money markets. Large well-known firms can usually obtain Euro-
dollar loans from the cheapest source by contacting Eurodollar
banks in different countries.
Since the Eurodollar market for both loans and deposits is highly
competitive, deposit rates and loan rates tend to be maintained
within a rather narrow range within the Eurodollar banking system.
Eurodollar loans are in competition with loans from domestic mar-
ket sources in individual countries, although in some countries local
borrowers are restricted by the monetary authorities as to how much
and under what conditions they can borrow in the Eurodollar mar-
ket. Borrowers requiring local currency for working capital must
bear the exchange risk of repaying dollars or other borrowed Euro-
currencies unless they cover their position in the forward market.
Alternatively, the Eurbcurrenéy banks may convert dollars or other
currencies obtained from Eurocurrency deposits into domestic or
third currencies for making loans.In this case, the banks must
either cover their positions in the same currencies or bear the ex-
change risk if their Eurocurrency liabilities exceed their Eurocur-
rency assets in a particular currency.
Ultimately the interest paid on Eurodollar deposits is determined
by the demand for Eurodollar loans. During 1968 and 1969, when
U.S. banks were borrowing heavily in the Eurodollar market, the
U.S. demand determined in large measure the interest rates on Euro-
dollar deposits. However, since the repayment of U.S. resident in-
debtedness in 1970 and 1971, the rates of interest that Eurodollar
banks have been willing to offer for Eurodollar deposits have been
governed largely by the foreign demand for loans, which demand
in turn is affected by domestic money market rates together withSubstitutability 77
government regulations on borrowing from the Eurodollar market.
In a recent study, Rodney H. Mills13 examined the relationship
between net Eurodollar positions of commercial banks in Belgium,
the Netherlands, France, and Germany on the one hand, and cov-
ered differentials between three-month Eurodollar rates and selected
domestic money rates on the other. Using quarterly BIS data for
the period September 1963—June 1969, Mills formulated a model
for explaining changes in the net Eurodollar positions of the com-
mercial banks in each of these four countries with nonresidents of
the countries in which the banks were located.His independent
variables were (1) the average covered differential between the
three-month Eurodollar rate and a selected domestic money market
rate in the quarter or in the month preceding the end of the quarter;
(2) bank loans to private domestic borrowers; and (3) for Belgium
and Germany, certain other variables. His multiple regression anal-
ysis shows that changes in covered interest differentials were closely
associated with changes in commercial bank net Eurodollar posi-
tions vis-à-vis nonresidents, excluding U.S. residents, for each of the
four countries. One explanation for his results is that commercial
banks find it profitable to borrow in the Eurodollar market for
expanding loans to their customers when the covered Eurodollar
interest rate is lower than the domestic market rate, and to lend to
the Eurodollar market (through depositing dollars in other Euro-
dollar banks) when the covered Eurodollar rate exceeds the domes-
tic market rate.This explanation reflects a close relationship be-
tween domestic lending and the Eurodollar market when there is
no substantial interference by government regulations. Since such
regulations existed during the period under examination in the
United Kingdom and Italy, these countries had to be excluded from
his analysis.Also, since the large BIS operations are included in
the BIS data on the dollar position of Swiss banks vis-à-vis non-
residents, Mills found it necessary to exclude Switzerland from his
analysis.
Mills' study constitutes an important contribution to the expla-
nation of changes in net dollar positions vis-à-vis nonresidents
13. See Rodney H. Mills, Jr., Explaining Changes inEurodollarPositions. A
Study of Banksin FourEuropean Countries, Discussion Paper No. 1, Washington,
D.C.: Federal Reserve Board, Division of International Finance, August 27, 1971.78 The Behavior of Foreign Dollar Holdings
(excluding U.S. residents) for the commercial banks of the four
countries covered. However, the task of explaining the aggregate
demand and supply of funds for the Eurodollar market as a whole
and of devising a satisfactory model for the determination of interest
rates in the market remains a complex and formidable undertaking
for which the statistical data available so far are seriously inade-
quate.
Influence of the Eurodollar Market
on the U.S. Balance of Payments
While we have stressed that the Eurodollar market can expand or
contract independently of the U.S. balance of payments, there is in
practice an interaction between developments in the Eurodollar
market and changes in the U.S. balance of payments. As has al-
ready been noted, U.S. balance-of-payments deficits may increase
the volume of liquidity in the rest of the world, which in turn may
expand the volume of Eurodollar deposits. The Eurodollar market
has attracted large U.S. private short-term capital flows to the mar-
ket, which tend to add to the dollar holdings of foreign central
banks and thus to have an adverse effect on the U.S. balance on
official reserve transactions account. Conversely, when U.S. resi-
dents borrow from the Eurodollar market, the U.S. balance on offi-
cial reserve transactions account will tend to improve. More broadly
viewed, however, both the flow of U.S. resident funds to the market
and U.S. borrowings from the market may serve to expand the Euro-
dollar market. Thus the large borrowing by U.S. banks was a major
factor in the rapid expansion of the Eurodollar market during 1968
and 1969; the higher Eurodollar deposit rates relative to domestic
money market rates abroad attracted foreign depositors, as did also
the promotional activities of foreign branches of U.S. banks seeking
Eurodollar funds for their parent banks. When the U.S. borrowings
were repaid during 1970 and 1971, Eurobanks, including foreign
branches of U.S. banks, sought new foreign loan markets in which
to place funds flowing from the United States. The "net size of the
market" as measured by the BIS continued to expand, although at
a somewhat slower pace than in 1968 and 1969.
Over the 1965—70 period, U.S. resident borrowings from andInfluence of the Eurodollar Market 79
repayments to the Eurodollar market through foreign branches of
U.S. banks were responsible for a substantial portion of the quarter-
to-quarter changes in net foreign nonofficial claims on U.S. resi-
dents.'4 Since to a substantial degree the dollars flowing out of the
Eurodollar market to U.S. residents either came from foreign cen-
tral banks or served to reduce additions to their American dollar
holdings, and since the American dollars repaid to the Eurodollar
market tended to flow into foreign. central banks, there was also a
strong association between changes in net U.S. resident borrowing
from the Eurodollar market and changes in the U.S. balance on
official reserve transactions account over the 1965—70 period. Thus
during the first three quarters of 1968 and the first and second quar-
ters of 1969, when U.S. resident borrowing from the Eurodollar
market was quite heavy, the U.S. balance on official reserve trans-
actions account was in surplus in each of these quarters. On the
other hand, in 1970 when U.S. residents were making large repay-
ments to the Eurodollar market, the U.S. balance on official reserve
transactions account was in substantial deficit in every quarter.15
In this way, borrowings from the Eurodollar market by U.S. banks
served for a time to hide the deterioration in the U.S. balance of
payments as far as the effects on foreign official holdings are con-
cerned and then, when the borrowings were repaid, to increase the
redundancy of dollars in foreign reserves.
While these U.S. short-term capital movements are directly re-
lated to the operations of the Eurodollar market, it has been sug-
gested that, in the absence of the Eurodollar market, foreign short-
term capital might have flowed to the United States during 1968
and 1969 in the presence of a tight U.S. money market, with much
the same consequences for the U.S. balance of payments. We doubt
I
14.The results of regression analysis of the relationship between quarterly
changes in net foreign nonofficial liquid claims on U.S. residents and in changes
in the U.S. official reserve transactions balance, on the one hand, and in the net
claim.s of foreign branches of U.S. banks on U.S. residents, on the other, are
presented in an article by Raymond F. Mikesell entitled "The Eurodollar Market
and the Foreign Demand for Liquid Dollar Assets," Journal of Money, Credit and
Banking, August 1972, pp. 643—683.
15. In the second quarter of 1970 there was a small increase in net claims of
foreign branches of U.S. banks on U.S. residents ($218 million), but this was not
sufficient to offset other factors in the U.S. balance of payments making for a
deficit on the U.S. official reserve transactions account.80 The Behavior of Foreign Dollar Holdings
very much that these flows would have occurred in anything like the
same volume. In the first place, Regulation 0,whichlimited the
rates of interest U.S. commercial banks could pay on time deposits
and CDs, applied to foreign nonofficial entities as well as to U.S.
residents. Hence, to a considerable degree, U.S. commercial bank
borrowing from abroad through their foreign branches was a means
of circumventing Regulation 0 as applied to foreigners. Second,
prior to October 1969, U.S. banks were not required to maintain
reserves on liabilities to their foreign branches. More broadly, how-
ever, we believe that the Eurodollar market provided a mechanism
for international financial intermediation for the mobilization of
large amounts of foreign liquid funds that would never have been
placed directly in the United States even in the absence of Reg-
ulation 0.
EFFECTS ON THE BASIC BALANCE
Perhaps a more significant question is whether the growth of the
Eurodollar market has had any impact on the U.S. basic balance,
either the goods and services component or the long-term capital
component. It is impossible to provide satisfactory evidence either
way; we can only speculate as to what the causal relationships might
be, if any. At the most general level, there have been allegations in
earlier postwar years that the growth of world trade was being im-
paired by a shortage of international liquidity. The argument was
usually made with respect to the rate of growth of official reserve
assets rather than private international liquidity. The Eurodollar
market made a modest contribution to foreign official reserve assets
as a consequence of foreign official depositing in the Eurodollar
market. This did not become very significant until after 1967, how-
ever, and few would argue that during this period world trade had
been constrained by a lack of dollar liquidity generally, or by a lack
of official reserves.
The expansion of international credit facilities provided by the
Eurodollar market may have induced some increase in world trade,
but such an expansion would not necessarily contribute to an im-
provement in the U.S. trade balance. It is possible for U.S. exports
to benefit from a redistribution of international liquidity.In the
absence of the Eurodollar market, an increase in foreign dollarInfluence of theEurodollarMarket 81
liquiditygenerated by a U.S. payments deficit would flow into the
reserves of the surplus countries. With the market, some of these
dollar funds may flow in the form of credits to deficit countries
where they become available for increased imports from the United
States and elsewhere. This flow would reduce the volume of domes-
tic credit in the capital exporting countries. In the absence of these
flows, the capital exporting countries might have contracted credit
as an anti-inflationary measure.
The U.S. current account and the capital account may
be affected by the ability of U.S. firms or their foreign affiliates to
borrow Eurodollars for financing working capital requirements or
for financing capital projects in foreign countries. The latter type
of investment frequently takes place under a Eurodollar revolving
commitment whereby a Eurodollar bank or a consortium of banks
makes a commitment for a period of from, say, three to five years
to lend the borrower up to a specified amount. Although actual
borrowings are usually evidenced by notes of maturities of less than
twelve months, the notes can be renewed during the overall period
of commitment, provided agreement is reached on the interest rate
for each Given the U.S. capital export control program,
it is quite likely that some U.S. direct foreign investment would
not have been made in the absence of the Eurodollar market. On
the other hand, some of these investments might have been made
by means of direct capital flows from the United States, which flows
would have affected the U.S. balance on basic transactions account.
To the extent Eurodollar credits have permitted a higher level of
U.S. direct investments, such investments may have tended both to
increase U.S. exports to U.S. affiliates abroad and to provide sub-
stitutes for U.S. exports to other customers.17
16. See Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, The Financing of Business with
Eurodollars,NewYork, 1967, p.8.
17.The increase might be expected to come in the form of capital goods dur-
ing the investment phase and thereafter in the form of materials and components.
The substitution effect would come when the affiliate's production displaces goods
previously supplied by the parent company. The relationship between U.S. exports
and imports and U.S. foreign investment is, however, a controversial issue with
which we shall not be further concerned in this book. See 0. C. Hufbauer and
F. M. Adler, Overseas Manufacturing Investments and the Balance of Payments,
Washington, D.C.:U.S. Treasury Department,1968; and Jack N. I3ehrman,
Direct Manufacturing Investment, Exports, and the Balance of Payments, New
York: National Foreign Trade Council, 1968.82 The Behavior of Foreign Dollar Holdings
A final consideration with respect to the impact on the U.S. bal-
ance of payments has to do with the effects of the Eurodollar mar-
ket on the international financial intermediation function of the
United States. The carrying out of this function has meant that the
United States has tended to make extensive loans and direct in-
vestments abroad, financed to a substantial degree by the foreign
acquisition of liquid dollar balances. The extension of the U.S.
banking system abroad has, to a degree, changed this financial inter-
mediation process. Instead of loans being made by the transfer of
American dollars from the United States, the loans are made by
U.S. banks operating abroad out of funds deposited by foreigners
in U.S. branches or in other Eurodollar banks that redeposit the
funds with U.S. branches. Insofar as the financing is shifted in this
way to foreign-owned dollars, in place of newly provided funds from
the United States, the deficit in the IJ.S.internationalaccounts' is
reduced. This transfer of the U.S. intermediation function is fur-
ther facilitated by the development of the Eurobond market, also
promoted by U.S. financial institutions, whereby long-term funds
required by U.S. firms operating outside the United States are raised
abroad. To what extent there has been a transfer of foreign loan
financing from parent banks in the United States to their foreign
branches is not known to the authors, but the amount must have
been considerable.The course of this process has been greatly
facilitated by the existence of the U.S. Voluntary Foreign Credit
Restriction Program (VFCR), so that it is difficult to determine
what the effect of the increased foreign financing by foreign
branches of U.S. banks would have been in the absence of those
restrictions.
National Monetary Policies and Controls
in Relation to the Eurodollar Market
As just indicated, the rapid development of the Eurodollar market
after 1963 was in considerable measure a, consequence of U.S.
credit and capital export controls, including the limits imposed by
Regulation Qonthe rate of interest U.S. commercial banks could
pay on time deposits and CDs, the VFCR program, and the con-National Monetary Policies and Controls 83
trols on U.S. direct foreign investment. These controls led to a
partial insulation of the U.S. capital market from that of the rest
of the world, which in turn promoted a market for time deposits
denominated in dollars outside the United States and a very large
expansion of U.S. foreign branches of U.S. banks to participate in
this market. However, while the U.S. domestic money market was
to a degree insulated from the Eurodollar market, the Eurodollar
market was strongly influenced by U.S. monetary policy and be-
came a channel for the transmission of U.S. domestic monetary
conditions to money markets abroad. One effect of the Eurodollar
market was to narrow interest rate differentials and to equalize
credit conditions among foreign money markets.If a particular
country desired to tighten credit, say, by increasing reserve require-
ments on domestic deposits, the banking system could acquire funds
for loans to domestic borrowers by attracting Eurocurrency deposits
from abroad. When, in 1971, some European countries began re-
quiring their commercial banks to maintain reserves, or marginal
reserves, on liabilities to foreigners, many large domestic corpora-
tions simply bypassed the domestic banking system and borrowed
abroad.Likewise, when the monetary authorities of a particular
country wanted to ease credit conditions, say, by reducing reserve
requirements, both commercial banks and nonbanks sought higher
yields abroad, particularly through the Eurocurrency market. In
addition to interfering with domestic credit objectives, the capital
outflow tended to reduce central bank reserves.
Throughout the 1 960s some European countries limited direct
access to the Eurodollar market by their own residents. This has
been true of Britain, France, and Italy, among others. Frequently,
as in the case of Britain, residents were limited by exchange control
regulations with respect to the acquisition of foreign currencies, and
commercial banks were limited in the amount of net foreign assets
they could acquire. In recent years, however, regulations have been
imposed by countries such as Germany and Switzerland, not for the
purpose of preventing short-term capital outflow, but rather for
limiting the inflow. The imposition of these controls has arisen in
part from the desire to limit the influx of dollars into the central
banks and in part from the desire to avoid the credit-expanding_ _
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effects of the acquisition of additional reserves bydomestic banks.'8
For example, the German government imposed marginal reserve
requirements on nonresident liabilities of commercial banks in
1971, and in February 1972 it announced a 40 percent deposit.
requirement on foreign borrowings of nonbanking corporations.
Switzerland introduced a 100 percent reserve requirement on net
foreign liabilities of banks, banned the sale of domestic securities
and certain other financial assets to foreigners, and imposed a 2
percent quarterly tax on foreign deposits held in Swiss banks in
excess of amounts held on June 30, 1972.'°
The effect of these capital import restriction measures by Euro-
pean countries has been to limit the demand for Eurodollar funds
arising from firms operating in these countries seeking to obtain
credit and from speculators throughout the world that have bor-
rowed Eurodollars for the purpose of converting them into strong
European currencies. However, the demand for Eurodollar loans
has expanded in other parts of the world, particularly in the de-
veloping areas and Eastern Europe.2° So long as there is sufficient
demand for Eurodollars to provide banks and nonbank depositors
with rates of return higher than those available in their domestic
money markets, funds will flow into the market from Western
Europe, the United States, and other areas where banks and other
liquid asset holders are permitted to place funds in the market.
18. The question of the ability of domestic monetary authorities to offset the
effects of capital inflow on the monetary system has been the subject of a number
of studies.See, for example, Manfred Wilims, "Controlling Money in an Open
Economy: The German Case," FederalReserveBank of St. Louis Review, April
1971; and Michael G. Porter, "Capital Flows as an Offset to Monetary Policy:
The German Experience," IMF Staff Papers, July 1972, pp. 395—424. Some ana-
lysts have sought to show that capital inflows have not contributed to a net expan-
sion of domestic credit, largely on the grounds that domestic reserves have in-
creased by more than could be accounted for by capital inflows.Others have
agreed with monetary authorities of Germany and certain other countries who
have held that, in the absence of direct controls over capital inflows, there are
severe limits to preventing such flows from increasing the monetary base.
19. For a review of recent monetary controls in European countries and Japan,
see Charles A. Coombs, "Treasury and Federal Reserve Foreign Exchange Opera-
tions," Monthly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, September 1972, pp.
210—232.
20. ibid., pp. 230—232.